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Explaining social policy preferences has become a major topic in comparative politics with labor market risk as a key
determinant of these preferences. However, one question continues to loom large: are preference divides blurred by
mixed households, that is, secure labor market participants living with vulnerable partners? In this article, we build on
the insider-outsider literature and show that while the household does matter, its mitigating effect is limited in scope
and strongly conditional on gender. Women’s preferences depend on their partner’s labor market situation, while men’s
preferences are unaffected by it. Overall, only a small minority of the population across Western Europe beneﬁts from
a “household safety net.” Our ﬁndings have important implications for understanding the politicization of insider-
outsider divides.
Explaining social policy preferences has become a keytopic in comparative politics. While for a long time, thestudy of welfare politics had been focused on power
relations, institutions, and structural factors, recent contribu-
tions have forcefully argued that microlevel preferences mat-
ter for explaining both politics and policies (e.g., Cusack, Iv-
ersen, and Rehm 2006; Iversen and Soskice 2001; Manza and
Brooks 2007; Rehm, Hacker, and Schlesinger 2012).
Over the last decades, advanced capitalist democracies have
been experiencing fundamental structural changes in their
labor markets. Deindustrialization, tertiarization, and labor
market deregulation have profoundly altered the structure
and distribution of labor market vulnerability, as the risks of
unemployment and atypical employment have increasingly
become concentrated among particular social groups (e.g., Ber-
nardi and Garrido 2008; Eichhorst and Marx 2012; Esping-
Andersen 1999a; Oesch 2006; Ranci 2010).
It is thus not surprising that the impact of labor market
transformation on social policy preferences of speciﬁc risk
groups has become one of the most prominent questions in
this ﬁeld’s literature. Scholars ask to what extent inequalities
in the distribution of labor market risk shape political pref-
erences and eventually political conﬂict by opposing different
segments of the workforce (e.g., Dancygier and Walter 2015;
Fernandez-Albertos and Manzano 2014; Gingrich and Ansell
2012; Häusermann 2010; Margalit 2013;Mughan 2009; Rehm
2009, 2011b; Walter 2010, 2015). Most speciﬁcally, this ques-
tion has been taken up by the literature on dualization and
insider-outsider divides, which examines how labor markets
are divided between, on the one hand, workers in relatively
secure, stable employment and, on the other hand, workers in
unstable, ﬂexible, ormarginal employment (e.g., Emmenegger
et al. 2012; Rueda 2005, 2007).
If mobilized and politicized, such a structural divide based
on labor market vulnerability has the potential to cut across
existing distributive conﬂict lines, hence its relevance for com-
parative politics. However, a necessary (though by far not suf-
ﬁcient) precondition for politicization is that people with dif-
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ferent degrees of labor market vulnerability actually differ in
their political preferences. Recent studies have established evi-
dence for exactly such differences (e.g., Burgoon and Dekker
2010; Häusermann, Kurer, and Schwander 2015; Häusermann
and Schwander 2011; Marx and Picot 2013; Rueda 2005). How-
ever, a key question has so far not been answered: as atypi-
cal employment and unemployment is unequally distributed
between men and women, the divide between insiders and
outsiders might run right through the middle of households
(Pierson 2001, 448). Therefore, the household might mitigate
or even obliterate preference divides between insiders and out-
siders, thereby “neutralizing” the link between labor market
vulnerability and preferences. In other words, living with a
partner who enjoys stable employment and thus provides an
economic safety net to the more vulnerable partner may erase
the effect of labor market risk on preferences. Such a mod-
erating effect of the household on insider-outsider divides has
become a well-rehearsed claim in the welfare state literature
for good reasons: an extensive literature in both sociology and
household economics has long debated the extent to which
and the conditions under which partners make choices and
form preferences to the beneﬁt of the household or their in-
dividual welfare (for a review, see Kan andHeath 2006; Pollak
2003). They ﬁnd substantial effects of the household on pref-
erences, especially for economically weaker women.
Despite these ﬁndings, the household question has hardly
ever been addressed systematically in the political science lit-
erature. This is surprising, given the strong focus on micro-
level preferences in the recent welfare state research and given
the fact that—in line with the studies reported above—studies
on voting behavior ﬁnd strong household effects on electoral
preferences, too (e.g., DeGraaf andHeath 1992; Kan andHeath
2006; Strom2014). Regarding the literature on dualization and
insider-outsider divides, this relative neglect is particularly prob-
lematic since labormarket vulnerability is so unequally spread
between men and women. Taking the household into account
may therefore have far-reaching implications. Indeed, know-
ing the extent to which individual labor market risk shapes
social policy preferences is crucial for its consequences for
a potential politicization of conﬂicts around insider-outsider
divides: if most people’s preferences for social and labor mar-
ket policy are blurred or neutralized by their household situ-
ation, dualization is unlikely to ever become a politically sa-
lient conﬂict. Taking the household seriously is the goal of
this article.
To date, we have very incomplete knowledge of the strength
of this household effect, as well as on its scope across differ-
ent countries. A working paper by Emmenegger (2010) and
a conference paper by Barrows (2012) are to our knowledge
the only empirical studies that integrated the household sit-
uation of respondents explicitly in the empirical analysis. Both
provide correlational evidence that people align their pref-
erences tomaximize overall householdwelfare. However, they
fail to differentiate theoretically and empirically divergent ef-
fects for men and women, thereby implicitly assuming sym-
metrical dependencies between both partners’ labor market
vulnerability. Given the existing research in sociology (Kan
and Heath 2006), economics (Neugart 2008), and the study of
voting behavior (Iversen and Rosenbluth 2006, 2010; Strom
2014), it is crucial to distinguish effects according to gender.
Moreover, these existing studies do not allow us to evaluate
the relevance of the household in terms of its demobilizing
effect on political conﬂict around labor market vulnerability.
From a broader comparative politics perspective, however,
the magnitude of this demobilizing effect is precisely what we
need to know in order to evaluate the potential of insider-
outsider divides to reshape welfare state politics.
Relying on survey data from the EU-SILC and the Euro-
pean Social Survey 4 from 2008, we show that individual labor
market vulnerability impinges social policy preferences, even
if we control for household composition: the more strongly
individuals are affected by labor market vulnerability, the
stronger are their preferences for redistribution and public job
creation. Second, and most importantly, we show that house-
hold composition doesmatter, but its effect is very limited: the
effect of the partners’ labor market situation prevails over the
individual risk situation only for a minority of respondents.
Moreover, the household effect is clearly conditional on gen-
der: women form their preferences with reference to their
partners’ labor market vulnerability, while this is generally
not the case for men. Hence, our ﬁndings show that the
household has the potential of neutralizing the effect of in-
dividual labor market vulnerability on preference formation
for the speciﬁc social group of female outsiders living with
a secure partner. This limited effect, however, remains far
from rendering insider-outsider divides obsolete generally, as
the share of female outsiders living with a secure partner re-
mains between 2% and 13% of the population across Euro-
pean countries.
The implications for the potential politicization of insider-
outsider divides in European welfare states are clear: such a
politicization may not happen or even fail for many reasons,
but if so, the household cannot be the only culprit. Rather, the
gender-speciﬁc effects we ﬁnd suggest a very speciﬁc mech-
anism: our results point to a multiplier effect of a spread of
labor market vulnerability amongmale breadwinners, because
men’s labor market situation affects not only their own pref-
erences but also the preferences of their spouses. Conversely,
such a multiplying effect remains absent as long as vulnera-
bility affects primarily dependent household members. Both
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the erosion of the male breadwinner model in Europe and in-
creasing labor market vulnerability among men (OECD 2010,
18) should therefore rather increase the likelihood of a polit-
icization of insider-outsider divides.
THEORY
The exceptional economic growth during the postwar decades
allowed for male full employment, growing status homogeni-
zation and job security regulations, a relatively cohesive work-
ing class, and social peace. Since then, however, advanced
industrial societies have moved to a postindustrial social and
labor market structure. Ever fewer people’s work biographies
correspond to the industrial blueprint of stable, full-time, and
fully insured insider employment, while a growing proportion
of the population deviates from the standard model and in-
curs higher labor market risks. Together with institutional bar-
riers to entry to European labor markets (Emmenegger 2009)
and policy reforms to deregulate and ﬂexiblize labor markets
(Emmenegger et al. 2012), three structural changes drive the
development toward an increasingly unequal distribution of
labor market risks: the tertiarization of the employment struc-
ture, the educational revolution, and the feminization of the
workforce. Since 2000, service sector employment outdid in-
dustrial employment throughout the OECD by a factor of
two to three (Oesch 2006, 31). Jobs in the service sector differ
from industrial employment, because they tend to be more
polarized (Goos and Manning 2007; however, see also Oesch
and Rodriguez Menes 2011) and they involve more atypical,
nonstandard employment, especially for women (Kroos and
Gottschall 2012). Part-time and temporary work has become
widespread and accounts for most of the job creation in the
EU since the 1990s. In addition to tertiarization, the educa-
tional revolution has led to a broader andmore heterogeneous
middle class. As a consequence, atypical employment and un-
employment increasingly affect middle-class workers as well
(Häusermann et al. 2015; Oesch 2006). Finally, the massive
entry of women into paid work coincides with the spread of
atypical employment throughout Western Europe (Esping-
Andersen 1999b; Estévez-Abe 2006). These structural trends
have contributed to the unequal distribution of the risk of
unemployment, involuntary temporary work, and part-time
employment (Eichhorst and Marx 2012; Esping-Andersen
2000; Jessoula, Graziano, andMadama 2010; Palier and Thelen
2010). Such periods of unemployment and forms of invol-
untary atypical employment have clear negative implications
for individuals in terms of lower income, reduced access to
vocational training, and weak contribution records to social
insurance schemes (Eichhorst and Marx 2012; Häusermann
and Schwander 2012), but also with regard to the risk of being
trapped in unstable and precarious employment and even
poverty (Oesch 2006; Tomlinson and Walker 2012).
Both the scholarly literature and the public debate have ad-
dressed this increasingly unequal distribution of labor market
vulnerability among the workforce in terms of dualization
(Emmenegger et al. 2012; Palier and Rueda 2007; Thelen 2010),
that is, growing inequality between insiders and outsiders with
regard to labor market integration and social rights. European
welfare states and labor markets are built on the premise of
permanent and full-time employment. Hence, a deviation from
this model of permanent, full-time employment may result in
welfare losses and even poverty risks, in particular in social
insurance based welfare states. For this reason, we consider
all forms of employment that deviate from the standard em-
ployment relationship (i.e., atypical employment and un-
employment) as conditions for employment risks and labor
market vulnerability. Our understanding of outsiders thereby
differs from a more narrow institutionalist distinction be-
tween outsiders and insiders based on employment protec-
tion only. By focusing on risk and vulnerability, we also de-
viate from a purely dichotomous conceptualization of insiders
and outsiders on the basis of labor market status (full time vs.
atypical or unemployed). Instead, we consider outsiders those
who incur a particularly high risk for atypical employment
and unemployment. In our view, such a deﬁnition on the ba-
sis of employment risk instead of employment status is better
suited to grasp the political implications of labor market du-
alization. Individuals form political preferences not primarily
on the basis of their momentary situation, but with regard to
their expectations about current and future risks, which they
derive from comparisons with the employment situation of
people in their occupational reference group.1 A risk-based
understanding of outsiders entails the additional advantage
that it allows for a continuous measure of labor market vul-
nerability instead of a dichotomous measure which is empir-
ically inadequate, since not all outsiders are equally exposed to
labor market risks.2 In the following, we theorize the link be-
1. Many women, for example, work full time at a young age before
(temporarily) withdrawing from the labor market for child rearing and
possibly reentering the labor market for a part-time job. Their employ-
ment trajectories clearly deviate from a standard employment biography, a
fact they are generally well aware of. On the formation of preferences with
regard to current and prospective risks, see also Walter (2010; 2015),
Rehm (2011a), Schwander and Häusermann (2013), and Margalit (2013).
2. Our conceptualization of labor market vulnerability resonates with
the measure of unemployment risk that Rehm (2009, 2011a, 2011b)
proposed. He provides evidence for the impact of unemployment risk on
social policy demand. Our work differs from these contributions, as we
take temporary employment and involuntary part-time employment into
account when conceptualizing labor market risk. These are the forms of
vulnerable employment that have spread most massively over the past two
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tween labor market vulnerability and social policy preferences
ﬁrst at the individual level, before contextualizing it with ref-
erence to the household in general and gender in particular.
Several recent studies have provided evidence for the
claim that insiders and outsiders differ in their social policy
preferences (Burgoon and Dekker 2010; Häusermann et al.
2015; Marx 2014; Marx and Picot 2013; Rueda 2005, 2007;
Schwander and Häusermann 2013).3 For our study on house-
hold effects, we build on this literature, but we deviate from it
in two respects: ﬁrst, as explained above, we focus on the risk
of being affected by unemployment or atypical employment
rather than the labor market status. Second, we conceptualize
social policy preferences with regard to the speciﬁc needs of
labor market outsiders, rather than focusing on general pref-
erences toward welfare state generosity or labor market reg-
ulation. Hence, we examine attitudes toward redistribution
and public job creation. Based on a rational choice perspective
of social policy preference formation, we suggest that labor
market vulnerability affects social policy preferences, because
social policies imply different distributive consequences for
insiders and outsiders. The main difference between insiders
and outsiders is the stability and extent of employment. Hence,
insiders with stable and secure full-time employment should
prefer social insurance policies, which distribute social rights
and beneﬁts in proportion to contributions. Conversely, in-
dividuals exposed to higher labor market vulnerability have a
speciﬁc interest in redistributive policies, that is, social ben-
eﬁts distributed on the basis of need, which compensate for a
weaker labor market integration (Reeskens and van Oorschot
2013). An alternative response to the speciﬁc needs of labor
market outsiders is employment promotion, that is, a proac-
tive strategy of creating jobs and fostering employability, rather
than passively compensating individuals for income loss (Lis-
ter 2004; Morel, Palier, and Palme 2011; Palier 2006). Since
unstable or limited access to the labormarket is precisely what
deﬁnes outsiders, such employment supporting policies—in-
cluding child care policies, active labor market policies, and
other policies facilitating labor market entry and enhancing
employment opportunities—are in the interest of outsiders.
Hence, our ﬁrst hypothesis:
H1. The stronger an individual’s labor market vul-
nerability, the stronger his or her support for income
redistribution and public job creation.
Second, and most importantly, we argue that this link be-
tween labor market vulnerability and preferences needs to
be contextualized with regard to household effects. Paul Pier-
son was among the ﬁrst to voice doubts about the still wide-
spread exclusive focus on individuals that characterizes much
of the comparative political economy work on distributive
preferences. He argued that labor market risks are distrib-
uted unequally across genders inmany countries and thus run
“right through themiddle of households” (Pierson 2001, 448).
Pierson’s claim has since then loomed large in the literature.
There are both intuitive and scientiﬁc reasons for the reso-
nance of his claim. It is well known that labor market vul-
nerability is unequally distributed between men and women
(e.g., Kroos andGottschall 2012; Schwander andHäusermann
2013). Also, sociological research has shown time and again
that gender differences in employment performance even am-
plify after marriage, with women becoming more vulnerable
and men less so (e.g., Kan 2014). Hence, it seems intuitively
plausible that many female outsiders live with male insiders,
and this may affect their preferences. However, there is also a
very substantial scientiﬁc foundation for the doubts Pierson
voiced. Indeed, the question to what extent individuals shar-
ing a household with a partner form their preferences based
on the household’s situation (rather than their individual char-
acteristics) is an old and important debate in economics and
sociology. In economics, Becker’s work (1964, 1981) has in-
troduced the idea of an altruist/interdependent family equi-
librium, in which both partners pool their resources and align
their preferences with whatmaximizes the household income.
In terms of social policy, this implies that both partners go
for policies that beneﬁt the economically dominant—male—
partner. This Becker equilibrium, however, presupposes that
marriage is a stable, complete contract. If spouses keep cur-
rent and future outside options in mind (Iversen and Rosen-
bluth 2006), they may behave more egoistically, as concep-
tualized by other economists in terms of a bargaining model
of the family. A similar debate about the appropriate level
of preference formation—the household or the individual—
has taken place in sociology, distinguishing between the
“borrowing” and the “independence”models of the family. In
the former, the woman is supposed to borrow her class iden-
tity from her husband, whereas her choices are inﬂuenced by
her own characteristics in the latter (Kan and Heath 2006;
Sorensen 1994).
In political science, the effect of the household on micro-
level preferences has been investigated only sparsely. A grow-
ing discussion can be found in the literature on voting and
electoral choice providing evidence for the interdependence
of political preferences of spouses. Much of the contributions
in the voting literature, however, focus on mechanisms of
decades and which are at the core of insider-outsider divides within the
employed workforce.
3. Emmenegger (2009) contests such differences. However, he only
investigates differences with regard to preferences for employment pro-
tection, which is arguably in the (current or prospective) interest of both
insiders and outsiders.
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interdependence such as communication, learning, and social-
ization (e.g., Johnston et al. 2005; Zuckerman, Fitzgerald, and
Dasovic 2005), rather than on economic interdependencies,
which are at the heart of our question and the debates in
economics and sociology. Nevertheless, a few studies do pro-
vide evidence that the household affects political preferences,
especially for economically dependent spouses (De Graaf and
Heath 1992; Kan and Heath 2006; Strom 2014). In light of
these studies, we argue that the dualization literature needs to
take household dynamics more seriously, both theoretically
and empirically. Iversen and Rosenbluth (2006) are an ex-
ception, as they show that—in linewith the “bargaining”model
of the household—the extent of the gender gap in preferences
and behavior depends on the economic outside options women
have in the labor market. The implication is again consistent
with the doubt raised by Pierson: economic dependencymakes
people rely on the household. In the more narrow dualization
literature, Emmenegger (2010) and Barrows (2012) are the
only contributions that test whether living in a household
makes a difference in terms of preferences of insiders and out-
siders. However, they do not theorize or analyze the house-
hold effects thoroughly, but assume symmetrical dynamics
for men and women and lack an estimation of the size of
the demobilizing effect of household interdependencies on
preferences.
We want to estimate the effect of the household on insider-
outsider preference divides. Our core idea is that outsiders’
precarious labor market situation can be secured or compen-
sated by sharing a household with an insider. Hence, if part-
ners pool their resources (as explicitly assumed by Becker
[1981] and implicitly by Emmenegger [2010] and Barrows
[2012]), the individual welfare of an outsider not only depends
on her or his own labor market vulnerability, but on the entire
household. Consequently, individuals take the maximization
of household welfare into account in their preference forma-
tion. In the extreme, an alignment of preferences within the
household may prevent labor market vulnerability from be-
coming a manifest conﬂict line in politics altogether (Barrows
2012). However, previous research shows that household ef-
fects are conditional on gender (e.g., Kan and Heath 2006;
Pollak 2003; Strom 2014). Therefore, we want to establish to
what extent and especially under what conditions the house-
hold situation affects the impact of an individual’s labor mar-
ket vulnerability on his or her distributive preferences. We do
so by developing and testing two further hypotheses.
First, the mechanism how the household is supposed to
affect preference formation relates to the provision of an eco-
nomic safety net if the partner is in a secure labor market
position. This idea corresponds to the resource-poolingmodel
that Becker advocates. Hence, for respondents living with a
partner who is shielded from labor market risks, the effect
of her or his own labor market vulnerability is mitigated by
the household situation. By contrast, for a respondent living
with a partner who is herself or himself exposed to strong
labor market risks, the household provides no safety net (i.e.,
contributes little to no resources to the pool) and therefore
the respondent’s own labor market situation is relevant for
preference formation. In other words: people living with an
insider may align their preferences with their economically
stronger partner, whereas people living with an outsider are
expected to advocate policies that respond to his or her own
economic situation. Consequently, we expect a positive inter-
action effect between a respondent’s and his or her partner’s
labor market vulnerability on social policy preferences:
H2. The partner’s labor market vulnerability reinforces
the link between the respondent’s labor market vul-
nerability and his or her social policy preferences.
We take this argument a step further on the basis of the
existing literature on women’s preference formation. We sug-
gest that the importance of the household effect, that is, the
extent to which the partner’s situation matters for an indi-
vidual’s preference formation is not uniform for men and
women. Rather, we contend that this effect depends on the
gender of the individual. Why do we expect men and women
to react differently to their partner’s labor market situation?
In the classical Becker efﬁciency model of a family with
perfect labor division (Becker 1964, 1981), economic re-
sources are pooled and the household is the basis of the
welfare of all members. The most efﬁcient equilibrium in
Becker’s conceptualization occurs when spouses specialize
in different tasks, with male breadwinners specializing in
outside work and women specializing in household work.
Thereby, Becker argues, both spouses maximize their wel-
fare and they both equally align their preferences with the
household. This model implies a strong imbalance between
partners in their economic strength, which explains why the
economically weaker partner would align with the econom-
ically stronger partner in the interest of the entire house-
hold. In more recent times, however, with generally high
divorce rates and higher rates of female labor market partic-
ipation, household welfare maximization is not necessarily
the dominant strategy for all household members (Iversen
and Rosenbluth 2006, 2010). In particular, the extent to which
spouses align their preferences to the household depends on
their employment and income opportunities outside of the
household. The weaker the outside options, the stronger the
reliance on household welfare provision. This reasoning im-
plies that people may behave according to the interdepen-
Volume 78 Number 4 October 2016 / 1049
This content downloaded from 130.060.047.022 on November 10, 2016 03:08:51 AM
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
dence model or the bargaining model, depending on their
outsider options, that is, their individual economic power.
Non-employment or weak labor market integration are con-
sidered the main reason for weak outside options.
However, these weakening factors universally affect women
to a greater extent than men, not least because of additional,
care-related negative effects on employment performance (Iver-
sen and Rosenbluth 2006). These gender-speciﬁc limitations
to employment performance and economic outside options
are not only due to biological reasons, but they are deeply en-
crusted in social norms and even institutionalized in countless
policy incentives for an unequal division of labor both in the
welfare state and the labor market (Esping-Andersen 1999b;
Orloff 1996). Therefore, women must expect weaker outside
options than men and thus have a stronger incentive than
men to take the labor market situation of their spouses into
account in their preference formation.4 Neugart’s (2008) study
in labor market economics provides tentative support for this
hypothesis: he shows that women who are only marginally em-
ployed or non-employed tend to support employment pro-
tection for the male breadwinner. Hence, the partner’s labor
market risk is expected to affect female preference formation
more strongly and directly than male preference formation.
H3. Household effects are gender asymmetrical: wom-
en’s preferences depend more strongly on the partner’s
employment risk than men’s.
With this contextualization of the household effect by gen-
der, we go beyond the simple question whether the house-
hold will prevent labor market vulnerability from becoming
a politically relevant conﬂict line. Rather, it will allow us to
understand the conditions under which this could be the
case, that is, the conditions under which dualization may
actually transform postindustrial welfare politics.
DATA, OPERATIONALIZATION, AND METHODS
Our empirical work is based on data from the European
Social Survey (ESS) round 4 (2008), which includes 13 West
European countries.5 Apart from the high quality of ESS data,
this survey is to date the only comparative data source that
contains both detailed information on labor market situation
and occupation, as well as particularly detailed questions on
attitudes toward different social policies, as the 2008 wave in-
cludes a speciﬁc module of questions on welfare attitudes. In
the following, we give a brief description of the main depen-
dent and independent variables.6
We measure preferences for need-based redistribution
by means of a question asking whether respondents think
that the government should take measures to reduce income
differences.7 For preferences regarding policies of publicly
supported employment creation, we use a question asking
whether respondents think that it is the government’s re-
sponsibility to provide a job for everyone who wants one.
This variable clearly focuses on employment rather than com-
pensation of income loss. Both variables are recoded, so that
higher values reﬂect higher preferences for the speciﬁc social
policy.
The degree of labor market vulnerability is our main in-
dependent variable.We conceptualize vulnerability as the risk
of being unemployed or/and in atypical employment (invol-
untary part-time, temporary employment, or helping in a fam-
ily business). For each individual, we measure this risk on the
basis of the frequency of unemployment and atypical em-
ployment within his or her occupational group, as the risk
of an individual depends strongly on the incidence of atypical
employment and unemployment in that person’s occupational
group (for an extensive discussion of our operationalization
of labormarket vulnerability, its validity, and implications, see
Schwander andHäusermann 2013). Similarly to Rehm’s work
on unemployment risk (Rehm 2009, 2011a, 2011b), we rely
on occupational groups for themeasurement of group-speciﬁc
frequencies of unemployment or atypical employment, be-
cause these frequencies vary considerably across occupational
groups. In computing group-based frequencies as a measure
of risk, it is crucial to choose theoretically relevant and mean-
ingful reference groups. The goal should be to use reference
groups that are reasonably homogeneous in the labor market
conditions their members are exposed to, both in the present
as in the future. At the same time, the reference groups should
be deﬁned by salient social characteristics, because we would
like to choose groups in a way that the individuals can be
reasonably expected to compare themselves to this group and
4. The same mechanism explains why women should generally be more
favorable than men toward welfare policies that provide a publicly funded
outside option, as well as toward speciﬁc social policies that support women’s
labor market participation (Estévez-Abe 2006; Estévez-Abe, Iversen, and
Soskice 2001). This is precisely the reason why we will control for gender in
our analyses.
5. Belgium, Switzerland, Germany, Denmark, Spain, Finland, France,
Greece, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Sweden, and the United Kingdom.
6. Detailed information on all operationalizations can be found in
table A1 in the appendix.
7. The variable corresponds to a standard measure of redistribution
preferences; see Jaeger (2006, 2009), Kulin and Svallfors (2013), Rehm
(2011a), Hacker, Rehm, and Schlesinger (2013). It has the advantage that it
refers directly to politics, that is, government action, rather than asking about
a general attitude on income differentials, a variable that is also available. We
ran all tests with both variables and results are robust.
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derive information about their own risk from the occurrence
of a grievance in this very reference group.
Therefore, we construct our occupational reference groups
on the basis of the most important sociostructural determi-
nants of unemployment and atypical employment. The three
sociostructural determinants we take into account are class,
gender, and age, which are all strong predictors of labor mar-
ket chances (Chauvel 2009; Esping-Andersen 1999a; Oesch
2006, 2013; Schwander and Häusermann 2013; Taylor-Gooby
1991). In other words, we assume that individuals can be rea-
sonably expected to derive information on their labor mar-
ket risk from what happens to their colleagues of the same
gender, the same age group, and in similar occupations. Class,
gender, or age alone would provide much too heterogeneous
groups to provide relevant information to its members.
With regard to class, we use the class schema by Oesch
in the collapsed version of Kitschelt and Rehm (Kitschelt
and Rehm 2006; Oesch 2006). They distinguish ﬁve occu-
pational classes: (i) high-skilled managers, self-employed,
and technical experts (which they call capital accumulators);
(ii) high-skilled professionals in the public and private service
sector (sociocultural professionals); (iii) unskilled and skilled
workers mostly in industry (blue-collar workers); (iv) un-
skilled and skilled employees in interpersonal services (low
service functionaries); and (v) routine and skilled clerks
(mixed service functionaries).8 We further distinguish those
ﬁve classes according to gender and age.
The combination of ﬁve classes, two sexes, and two age
groups (below/above or equal to 40) leaves us with 20 oc-
cupational groups, which serve as the basis of our measure-
ment.9 We compute the rates of unemployment, involuntary
part-time, or temporary employment10 for each occupational
group and the average workforce in every country with data
of the EU-SILC from 2007. We then subtract the average rate
of the workforce from the group-speciﬁc rates in each coun-
try, in order to obtain the group-speciﬁc deviations (over- or
underrepresentation) in unemployment, involuntary part-
time, and temporary employment.11
The average of these three standardized deviations pro-
vides us with a continuous measure of labor market vul-
nerability, which is speciﬁc to an occupational group in a
country.12 We then attribute the value to each respondent
in our main data set, the ESS 2008.13 Respondents belong-
ing to occupational groups with a lower labor market vul-
nerability than the entire workforce have negative values on
our indicator of vulnerability, while respondents belonging
to groups with a labor market vulnerability that exceeds the
national workforce average have positive values. The avail-
ability of information on the occupational proﬁle of the part-
ner in the ESS allows us to compute the very same measure
of labor market vulnerability for the respondent’s partner.
The distribution of labor market vulnerability is, as ex-
pected, highly unequal between the occupational groups but
also between gender, generations, and economic sectors. La-
bor market vulnerability is most unequally distributed in
the countries of Continental and Southern Europe and also
higher on average than in the Nordic countries or in Great
Britain (see ﬁg. B1 in the appendix; apps. A–E available
online). In the appendix we also provide an extensive dis-
cussion of the vulnerability scores of different occupational
groups across the countries. Table B1 shows that women,
workers below the age of 40, and low-skilled individuals are
the most vulnerable groups across all countries. More spe-
ciﬁcally, female low-skilled service sector workers and fe-
male blue-collar workers (a comparatively small group) are
the most vulnerable groups, while male medium- and high-
skilled managers and technical experts enjoy the most se-
cure positions. Jobs in the service sector are characterized
by a higher labor market vulnerability, conﬁrming the in-
sights from labor market sociology about the higher rates of
vulnerability and nonstandard contracts in service sector jobs,
8. Relying on this class scheme implies that we include all respondents
in our analysis who have been attributed an isco-code in the ESS data. The
isco-code is based on the current or last occupation, so that we also include
most unemployed, housewives and pensioners in the data. Generally, less
than 8% of all respondents lack information regarding the isco-code.
9. We set 40 as the age threshold because a substantial share of the
population is still in education in their thirties in most European countries
(Couppi and Mansuy 2003).
10. Due to their low proportion (1.2% of respondents), we refrained
from constructing a separate category for helping in a family business and
added them to the category of temporary employment.
11. The reason for subtracting the national average from the group-
speciﬁc values lies in the relational nature of labor market risks. A group-
speciﬁc unemployment rate of 10% has a different meaning in a country
with a national unemployment rate of 5% than in a country where un-
employment is at 15%.
12. As a robustness check, we computed labor market vulnerability
also in two additional ways, one including only the deviation from the
national average on unemployment and one relative to atypical employ-
ment only (involuntary part-time and temporary employment). Our re-
sults are robust to the three speciﬁcations of labor market vulnerability,
with household effects being weaker for the measure based on unem-
ployment only.
13. We do not calculate the values of labor market vulnerability di-
rectly in the ESS for one main reason: the number of cases. The number of
respondents (3,500–8,500 respondents for each country) in the EU-SILC
is unrivaled by any comparative survey. It thus allows a precise measure-
ment of labor market vulnerability across countries even for those groups
which are naturally small (such as older female blue-collar workers, for ex-
ample) which is even more important since we rely on labor market con-
ditions (unemployment, atypical employment) that affect small portions of
the workforce only.
Volume 78 Number 4 October 2016 / 1051
This content downloaded from 130.060.047.022 on November 10, 2016 03:08:51 AM
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
particularly at the lower end of the skill distribution (see
Oesch 2006, 2013). It is precisely these less secure, non-
standard, low-skilled service jobs that continue to foster em-
ployment growth, together with the more stable and highly
paying service jobs at the top of the skill distribution (Oesch
and Rodriguez-Menes 2011; Wren 2013). The high degree
of vulnerability in the lower skilled jobs in the manufactur-
ing sector (blue-collar workers), by contrast, results largely
from deindustrialization. Therefore, labor market risk in these
sectors consists mainly of unemployment risks, as jobs are
shrinking (see Schwander and Häusermann [2013] for a more
detailed decomposition of unemployment and atypical em-
ployment risks). The recent economic crisis in Europe has
exacerbated these unemployment risks.
Given the construction of the occupational reference
groups based on the major determinants of unemployment
and atypical employment, our indicator of labor market vul-
nerability is obviously closely related to class, gender, and
age. Therefore, including all these components in the model
would by deﬁnition create severe problems of multicollin-
earity. At ﬁrst glance, one may thus ask if our indicator of
labor market vulnerability actually adds value to the infor-
mation on a respondent’s occupational reference group. It
indeed does, because it represents the actual mechanism
through which we expect membership in these groups to
affect social policy preferences. Consequently, we need to
control in our analyses for rival mechanisms that might re-
late these same groups to policy preferences. Therefore, we
include a range of control variables that have been shown
to be relevant in previous research (De La O and Rodden
2008; Emmenegger 2009; Rehm 2009, 2011a, 2011b; Rueda
2005; Scheve and Stasavage 2006). We include household
income (measured in deciles), public employment, and trade
union membership as well as gender, age, educational levels
(the highest achieved educational degree), the number of chil-
dren, and migrant status. To control for the inﬂuence of cul-
tural values which have also been shown to be class related
on social policy preferences, we include church attendance
(how often do you attend religious services) and cultural lib-
eralism (support for equal gay rights).14 To show that labor
market risk matters more than the actual labor market sta-
tus, we include the type of contract (permanent vs. nonper-
manent) in the analyses.
As the method of analysis, we use ordered logit regres-
sions, as the number of West European countries in the ESS
(13) is too small in order to properly test hypotheses in a
multilevel framework (Stegmueller 2013). Instead, we em-
ploy country ﬁxed effects to control for the fact that indi-
viduals are nested in countries and thus share the same
macro context and country-clustered standard errors to cor-
rect for the within-country correlation of errors.
EMPIRICAL RESULTS
The effect of labor market vulnerability
on individual social policy preferences
Table 1 shows the determinants of preferences for redis-
tribution and public job creation. For both dependent var-
iables, we specify three models. The model 1 tests the direct
effect of the respondent’s labor market vulnerability. Model 2
introduces the partner’s labor market vulnerability, to test
whether the direct effect remains or disappears if we con-
trol for the household situation. Both model 1 and model 2
test our ﬁrst hypothesis regarding the effect of the respon-
dent’s labor market vulnerability on social policy preferences.
Model 3 introduces the household interaction effect that
we postulated in hypothesis 2: we expect the respondent’s
labor market vulnerability to have a weaker effect on pref-
erences when he or she lives with an insider than when he
or she lives with a partner who is himself or herself exposed
to labor market vulnerability.
We ﬁrst discuss the linear effects in models 1 and 2. They
show that individual labor market vulnerability is clearly
linked to higher support for redistribution and job creation.
This is exactly what our hypothesis predicted, as it shows
that labor market vulnerability shapes the social policy de-
mand of individuals in ways consistent with the insider-
outsider literature. Moreover, the effects remain consistent
and robust when we control for the partner’s labor market
vulnerability, which is itself also positively correlated with
demand for social policy.15 The control variables largely con-
ﬁrm the ﬁndings of previous studies on social policy prefer-
ences. We see that in addition to labor market risk, vertical
stratiﬁcation in terms of education and income structures
welfare preferences strongly: both income and education have
14. We control for cultural liberalism to rule out the possibility that
social policy preferences are an expression of a postmaterialist value ori-
entation of speciﬁc occupational groups. The ESS does not allow mea-
suring postmaterialist values as suggested by Inglehard (1977). However,
we tried different additional operationalizations: support for law and order
(people who break the law should be sentenced to harsher sentences),
gender equality (women should be prepared to cut down on paid work for
the sake of family), and a composite measure of the three indicators. The
results are robust to all measures.
15. It is important to note that for reasons of comparability, we in-
clude in our regressions only those respondents who actually do have a
partner, which reduces our number of cases from about 19,000 to about
8,000. When testing model 1 with all respondents included, our results
remain robust. The core ﬁnding of model 1 also holds when looking only
at those individuals without a partner (results shown in table C1 in the
appendix).
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the expected negative effect on social policy preferences.
Gender, age, and immigration status have no consistent di-
rect effect on preferences for redistribution and job creation.
Also, having a nonpermanent contract does not have an
effect on preferences for redistribution and public job crea-
tion. Cultural liberalism, public sector employment, union
membership, and having children are positively related to at-
titudes toward outsider-friendly policies while church atten-
dance has a weak but consistently negative effect on these
preferences.
It has been argued that insider-outsider preference di-
vides are, even if signiﬁcant, very small or even marginal (Em-
menegger 2009; Pierson 2001). Figure 1 shows otherwise: it
presents the substantive effects of labor market vulnerability
Table 1. Determinants of Social Policy Preferences: Coefﬁcients from Ordered Logit Regressions
M1: Preference For. . . M2: Preference For. . . M3: Preference For. . .
Redistribution Job Creation Redistribution Job Creation Redistribution Job Creation
Respondent’s outsiderness .187*** .178** .175*** .171** .199*** .188***
(.06) (.07) (.07) (.07) (.07) (.07)
Partner’s outsiderness .160*** .092** .166*** .094*
(.05) (.04) (.04) (.05)
Outsiderness respondent #
Outsiderness partner .192*** .152**
(.03) (.06)
Education 2.110*** 2.086** 2.104*** 2.083** 2.107*** 2.085**
(.03) (.04) (.03) (.04) (.03) (.04)
Income 2.163*** 2.105*** 2.155*** 2.100*** 2.153*** 2.099***
(.01) (.02) (.01) (.02) (.01) (.02)
Female 2.047 .109 .102* .195** .090 .186**
(.07) (.10) (.06) (.08) (.06) (.08)
Age .006 2.001 .007 2.000 .007 2.000
(.00) (.00) (.00) (.00) (.00) (.00)
Public employment .135** .063* .143** .067** .134** .060*
(.06) (.03) (.06) (.03) (.06) (.04)
Cultural liberalism .216*** .001 .219*** .003 .221*** .003
(.04) (.07) (.04) (.07) (.04) (.07)
Union membership .317*** .353*** .304*** .346*** .300*** .341***
(.08) (.05) (.07) (.05) (.08) (.05)
Children .081*** .011 .086*** .012 .091*** .017
(.02) (.05) (.02) (.05) (.02) (.05)
Immigrant status 2.152 .069 2.144 .071 2.147 .071
(.11) (.12) (.11) (.12) (.11) (.12)
Employment contract 2.063 .038 2.053 .042 2.045 .045
(.07) (.04) (.07) (.04) (.07) (.04)
Church attendance 2.049 2.071** 2.048 2.070* 2.043 2.069*
(.04) (.04) (.04) (.04) (.04) (.04)
Country ﬁxed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Pseudo R2 .172 .113 .174 .114 .175 .115
BIC 241,347.6 227,468.9 241,351.1 227,464.3 241,353.7 227,463.0
N 6,932 6,932 6,932 6,932 6,932 6,932
Log likelihood 29,855.4 216,768.2 29,849.2 216,766.0 29,843.5 216,762.3
Note. Data source: ESS 4 2008. Ordered logistic regression with clustered standard errors and country dummies, the data are weighted; Country dummies
and cut-points are not shown due to space restriction; Pseudo R2 is the McKley and Zavoina R2
* Signiﬁcant at the .10 level.
** Signiﬁcant at the .05 level.
*** Signiﬁcant at the .01 level.
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in terms of predicted probabilities to support or oppose re-
distribution or public job creation. For these calculations, we
have recoded the two variables redistribution and job crea-
tion in terms of support or opposition as shown below each
graph. Both graphs nicely show the considerable effect of la-
bor market vulnerability. Going from the minimum level of
vulnerability to the maximum, the probability that an aver-
age individual will support outsider-friendly policies increases
by about 25 percentage points with regard to redistribution
and even by nearly 30 percentage points regarding public job
creation.16 Moreover, with rising labor market vulnerability,
respondents become extremely unlikely to oppose redistri-
bution, whereas pronounced insiders show probabilities of
disapproval that range around 20%. These results correspond
to our expectation that labor market vulnerability substan-
tially increases the support for a welfare state based on em-
ployment creation and need.
Does the fact that labor risks run through the middle of
the household affect the effect of labor market vulnerability
on social policy preferences? Model 3 in table 1, as well as
ﬁgure 2 presents the results for the interaction effect. We
ﬁnd the positive interaction effects we expected in hypoth-
esis 2: the partner’s labor market vulnerability reinforces
the effect of the respondents situation on his or her support
for outsider policies.
Figure 2 shows that the marginal effect of a respondent’s
own labor market vulnerability on his or her preferences for
redistribution is signiﬁcant when the partner is in an av-
erage or weak labor market position (vulnerability mea-
sures of 20.5 or higher). This implies that the effect of the
respondent’s own situation is signiﬁcant for a clear majority
of respondents (about 57%). If the partner is, however, in a
pronouncedly stable and secure employment position, the
respondent’s own labor market vulnerability does not sig-
niﬁcantly affect his or her preferences for redistributive pol-
icies. This ﬁnding holds similarly for preferences regarding
public job creation (see the right part of ﬁg. 2), and it
suggests that the household situation needs to be taken into
account when analyzing insider-outsider divides.
Contextualizing the household effect:
Differences between men and women
This brings us directly to the third hypothesis according
to which we expect the effect of the partner’s situation on
preference formation to be gender asymmetrical, with wom-
en’s preferences depending more strongly on their partner’s
employment vulnerability than men’s. Due to the notorious
difﬁculties of interpreting interaction effects (Brambor, Rob-
erts, and Golder 2006), we present the gender-asymmetrical
interaction effects graphically in ﬁgure 3. More speciﬁcally,
ﬁgure 3 displays the predicted probabilities of agreeing with
the statement that the government should take measures to
reduce income differences (values p 4 and 5) or that the
Figure 1. Predicted probabilities of supporting or opposing redistribution or job creation, depending on the respondent’s outsiderness. All graphs based on
model speciﬁcations of model 3 in table 1 (above, dependent variable dichotomized as indicated). Predicted probabilities for a respondent with median
(/mean/mode) values on all categorical (/continuous/dummy) variables except outsiderness.
16. The average individual is a 48-year-old woman with an upper
secondary degree, who is not a union member, has a household income
within the sixth earning decile, agrees that gays and lesbians should live as
they wish, is not a public servant, does not have children living at home, is
a citizen of the country, has an unlimited working contract, and attends
church only on special holidays.
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government should provide a job for everyone (valuesp 7
to 10) separately for men and women. The underlying lo-
gistic regressions are shown in table D1 in the appendix.
We ﬁnd exactly the expected pattern: the partner’s labor
market vulnerability reinforces the effect of the respondent’s
own risk on preference formation for women signiﬁcantly,
but not at all for men.17
Three aspects of ﬁgure 3 are relevant: the slope of the
lines, the size of the conﬁdence intervals, and the range
within which differences between men and women are sig-
niﬁcant. The lines display the average predicted probabili-
ties for men and women separately. They show that women,
whose partners also experience strong labor market risks,
support redistribution very strongly (about 80% probability).
Women living with an insider, on the other hand, are al-
most equally likely to agree or disagree with redistribution
(probability of slightly more than 50%). The strongly posi-
tive slope of the line thus suggests that women’s preferences
depend clearly and profoundly on the labor market situation
of their partner. By contrast, the line referring to the pre-
dicted probabilities of men supporting redistribution is al-
most horizontal and even slightly negative, indicating that
men’s preferences depend much less on the labor market
vulnerability of their partner.
The pattern of effects is almost identical for preferences
regarding job creation: the probability for women to sup-
port such policies increases by about 30 percentage points if
the risk of their partner changes from the minimum (in-
sider) to the maximum (outsider) value. Again, the effect is
different for men: if they live with an outsider, their support
for public job creation is even lower than if they form a
household with an insider. Overall, the most striking aspect
of ﬁgure 3 is the opposing slopes for men and women with
regard to preferences for redistribution and public job cre-
ation. The positive slopes for women indicate that their
support for outsider policies is lower if they live with an
insider who provides a security net, which is precisely the
mechanism assumed to mitigate insider-outsider divides over-
all. Men, by contrast, seem to evaluate policies from a dif-
ferent perspective: the more precarious their partner’s labor
market situation, the more skeptical they are toward outsider-
friendly policies. We interpret this striking ﬁnding as reﬂect-
ing a male-breadwinner logic: most men (still) have relatively
secure employment (the average value of labor market vul-
nerability among men is around 2.4, as can be seen by the
narrowest point of the conﬁdence interval). While their own
labor market risk shapes their preferences in the expected
way, a precarious labor market status of their partner even
seems to reinforce their insider preferences, as they dispro-
portionately tend to carry the responsibility for the economic
well-being of the household.
The second important piece of information in ﬁgure 3
concerns the number of cases: one could argue that house-
holds are very unequally distributed across the graph, so that
Figure 2. Marginal effect of labor market vulnerability (outsiderness) on attitudes toward redistribution and job creation, depending on the partner’s labor
market vulnerability. All graphs based on model speciﬁcations of model 3 in table 1 (above).
17. When calculating the models without the interaction effect (results
not shown) in order to test for direct household effects, we see that for
both redistribution and job creation, the partner’s labor market vulnera-
bility has a direct and positive effect on the female respondents’ prefer-
ences but it is insigniﬁcant for men. Men’s preferences are mainly affected
by their own labor market vulnerability. Moreover, we have calculated
predicted probabilities of supporting redistribution and public job crea-
tion for singles (results not shown), and we ﬁnd no gender differences.
This reinforces the main point of our analysis, that is, that the household
matters in people’s preference formation.
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we risk ﬁnding strong effects that are due to very few cases.
However, the size of the conﬁdence intervals gives a precise
idea of where our cases are located. Most observations are
located around narrow conﬁdence intervals (e.g., women liv-
ing with partners whose labor market vulnerability is slightly
negative). Fewer women live with outsider partners, which is
why the conﬁdence intervals increase in the positive range of
partner’s labor market vulnerability. Moreover, it is impor-
tant to note that the graph only shows within-sample varia-
tions, meaning that the lines disappear when cases disappear.
This explains why the lines for women end more to the left
than the lines for men, as there are fewer women living with
pronounced outsider partners.
The last aspect that we want to highlight in ﬁgure 3 is the
range within which differences between men and women are
signiﬁcant, that is, the range where the conﬁdence intervals
of the two lines do not overlap. This is the case for respon-
dents whose partner’s labor market vulnerability is higher
than 20.5.
To sum up the ﬁndings of ﬁgure 3: men’s preferences are
largely independent from the labor market vulnerability of
their partners, while women’s preferences depend strongly
on the labor market position of their partners.
One could argue that pooling over a diverse sample of
countries might mask important differences between coun-
tries, as individual behavior and preferences are also struc-
tured by the national institutional context (Gingrich and
Ansell 2012; Iversen and Rosenbluth 2006, 2010). We thus
conducted separate analyses for the 13 countries in our sam-
ple. The results are shown graphically in appendix E. The
gender-asymmetrical pattern we observed in ﬁgure 3 is clearly
corroborated by these country-speciﬁc graphs. Opposing slopes
for men and women turn out to be a very general pattern, ir-
respective of the domestic particularities of the welfare state
in these various countries. Where the slopes are not entirely
opposing, women are at least much more sensitive to a change
in their partner’s labor market vulnerability than vice versa.
Overall, we conclude that vulnerability in the labor mar-
ket affects the social policy preferences substantially for
most people. The mitigating household effect is conditional
both on the labor market vulnerability of the partner and
on gender, and it is relevant only for a minority of respon-
dents. More precisely, the household neutralizes the effect
of individual labor market vulnerability on social policy pref-
erences exclusively for female outsiders living with secure
partners who can provide a household safety net. In order
to estimate the size of the demobilizing effect of the house-
hold, we need an operational deﬁnition of “female outsiders”
and “secure partners.” We make use of the natural cut-point
(at the value zero) in our outsiderness measure to differen-
tiate between women in occupational reference groups with
above-average vulnerability (positive outsiderness values)
and those with below-average vulnerability (negative outsid-
erness values). All women with positive values on the out-
siderness scale are coded as female outsiders. In contrast, we
deﬁne male insiders as secure partners when their vulnera-
bility is lower than the average labor market risk among men
(outsiderness values lower than 20.5). In our entire sample,
almost 50% of all outsider women who do live in a house-
hold indeed have such a secure partner (i.e., a partner with
labor market vulnerability below the average of male labor
market vulnerability). This is an important share of outsiders
and, for them, the household indeed neutralizes the effect of
their own situation on preferences.
Figure 3. Predicted probability of supporting redistribution and job creation for men and women, depending on the partner’s labor market vulnerability.
Based on model speciﬁcation as in table C1 in the appendix. Average predicted probabilities for men and women.
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However, if we discuss this result with regard to its
overall relevance for the possible political mobilization of
an insider-outsider divide in the entire population, we have
to estimate how large a group these outsider women with
secure partners is. Figure 4 shows the share of female out-
siders with a safety net insider partner among all respon-
dents for each country. In total, the (population weighted)
share of female outsiders in such a situation is 8% of all
respondents. The rank order of the countries by the share
of outsiders with a household safety net is striking: the four
countries with the largest shares of outsiders with a safety
net are all Continental countries (Switzerland, Germany,
the Netherlands, and Belgium), while in the Nordic (save
Denmark) and Southern countries, fewer outsiders enjoy
such a securing household situation. Across countries, the
share of outsiders with a household safety net varies from
2% in Finland to 13% in Switzerland. That means that even
in the country where the household effect affects the largest
group, only the preferences of 13% of all respondents could
possibly be neutralized by the household. In other words:
we do ﬁnd a strong effect of the household, but only for a
small group of the population.18 Hence, for the large ma-
jority of respondents labor market vulnerability is clearly
relevant for their social policy preferences.
CONCLUSIONS
In this article, we examined the link between labor market
risks and social policy preferences. We found clear, sub-
stantial, and robust effects of labor market vulnerability on
preferences for different social policy principles. The higher
the risk of being in unemployment or in atypical employ-
ment, the more strongly people support need-based redis-
tribution and employment support policies. These effects
are robust and they are substantial: going from the lowest
to the highest value of labor market vulnerability, the pre-
dicted probability of supporting redistribution and public
job creation increases by 25–30 percentage points. Put dif-
ferently: if we look at preferences for policies that actually
matter for outsiders speciﬁcally (rather than general mea-
sures of welfare state generosity or employment security),
we ﬁnd strong effects for a large majority of respondents.
This is an important precondition for a possible politiciza-
tion of insider-outsider divides.
Our main ﬁnding is that labor market vulnerability cor-
relates clearly with social policy preferences, even if we take
the economic situation of the household into account. While
a growing literature provides evidence for a link between
labor market vulnerability and social policy preferences, no
study has systematically evaluated the ways in which and the
extent to which the household moderates this link. In the
light of the highly unequal prevalence of labor market vul-
nerability among men and women, as well as the important
literature on household effects in sociology, economics, and—
increasingly—the voting literature, this neglect is problem-
atic. In our article, we not only tested the moderating effect
of the household situation on the link between labor market
vulnerability and social policy preferences, but we also sub-
stantiated the extent and scope of this moderating effect. We
demonstrate that the preference divides are not obliterated
by the fact that partners forming a household tend to be ex-
posed to different levels of labor market vulnerability. The
effect of the partner’s situation differs across household types
and, most relevantly, for men and women. Only when the
partner is a clear insider, which is the case for a minority of
individuals, does an increase in the respondent’s labor mar-
ket vulnerability lose its effect on his or her preferences for
outsider-friendly policies. Moreover, we were able to show
that men’s welfare state preferences are by and large inde-
pendent from their partner’s labor market position. Only for
women do we ﬁnd a clear effect of the partner’s labor mar-
ket vulnerability on their own preferences. Our ﬁndings are
consistent with research in sociology and voting behavior,
which has also shown strongly gender-asymmetric effects of
the household impact. However, our study differs from these
previous studies, because we look at labor market risk as the
dimension of economic dependence, rather than income.
Given that labor market participation is the key factor in-
ﬂuencing women’s outside options in households, we believe
that our ﬁndings also speak to the voting literature, which
Figure 4. Share of female outsiders with safety net insider partner on total
respondents, by country
18. This is how we arrive at a small group: in our sample, about 51%
of respondents are women. About 60% of these women actually live in
households. About half of those living in households are considered out-
siders (i.e., labor market vulnerability above zero), and again about half of
these outsider women in a household have a secure partner.
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might focus more strongly on labor market characteristics
than in the past.
In the dualization literature, the claim that this divide
runs right through the household, thereby blurring insider-
outsider divides, has loomed large for a while now. Our re-
sults show that it is clearly important to take the household
context into account. However, we should be careful not to
throw out the baby with the bath water. Yes, households do
mitigate insider-outsider divides, but only for a very limited
group of the population: women who live with partners
who are particularly strongly shielded from labor market
vulnerability. To put this into perspective, only between 2%
and 13% of respondents in each country are female outsiders
with such a safety net for whom their individual position in
the labor market is not relevant for preference formation.
The starting point of our analysis was the increasing in-
equality in the distribution of labor market vulnerability in
European societies, a phenomenon becoming even more
acute and salient in the context of the recent austerity crisis.
Whether this inequality in labor market vulnerability trans-
lates into actual politicization of insider-outsider divides in
the political arena of decision making depends on whether
those affected by vulnerability think differently and want
different things than those shielded from vulnerability. Since
labor market vulnerability hits women more severely than
men, the neutralizing effect of the household may be one
reason why we have seen little of such a politicization so far,
but it certainly cannot be the only explanation. Indeed, our
ﬁndings suggest that the demobilizing effect takes place only
in a minority of households.
However, and this is probably the most far-reaching if
by now rather speculative implication of our analysis, the
more vulnerability will affect men, too, the more likely such
a politicization becomes, not only because men’s needs
have a multiplier effect on the preferences of their partners,
but also because fewer and fewer women will be able to rely
on a household safety net. The erosion of the male bread-
winner insider status and the fact that the crisis deterio-
rated men’s employment prospects far more than women’s
indeed has the potential to sharply transform welfare pol-
itics in European societies.
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